Knowing that one sees
pp. 249-282
in: Esa Saarinen, Risto Hilpinen, Ilkka Niiniluoto, Merrill Provence Hintikka (eds), Essays in honour of Jaakko Hintikka, Berlin, Springer, 1979Abstract
In his essay "On the Logic of Perception' (1969) Jaakko Hintikka argued that the logic of perceptual terms ("perceive', "see', "hear', etc.) is a branch of his more general theory of propositional attitudes. According to this thesis, perception — just like knowledge, belief, and memory — is a pro-positional attitude in the sense that it involves a relation between a person (the "percipient') and a proposition. Moreover, the syntax and the semantics of expressions of the form "a perceives that p' can be analyzed by means of the possible-worlds semantics essentially in a similar fashion as Hintikka has treated epistemic logic in his classical Knowledge and Belief (1962) and in a series of later papers.1
