Other minds embodied

Søren Overgaard

pp. 65-80

in: Andrew Inkpin, Jack Reynolds (eds), Merleau-Ponty's gordian knot, Continental Philosophy Review 50 (1), 2017.

Abstract

I distinguish three kinds of other minds problems—conceptual, epistemological and empirical. I argue that while Merleau-Ponty believes embodiment helps with tackling the conceptual and epistemological problems, he suggests that it is of no clear use in solving (an important variant of) the empirical problem. I sketch some considerations that could lend support to Merleau-Ponty's claims about the conceptual and epistemological problems, without claiming that these are conclusive. I then proceed to argue that Merleau-Ponty's take on the empirical problem is essentially correct.

Cited authors

Merleau-Ponty Maurice