Formal and real logic

pp. 93-111

in: Edmund Husserl, Introduction to logic and theory of knowledge, Berlin, Springer, 2008

Abstract

Now, the relationship of formal ontology to metaphysical ontology and, thereby, at the same time, of logic and metaphysics, also requires examination. What is metaphysics and metaphysical ontology? Historically, the term metaphysics was an accidental name for the Aristotelian work that deals with the science that Aristotle himself called "First Philosophy". And, finally, supplanting the original Aristotelian name, it became the name for that very science.Aristotle defined First Philosophy as the science of Being as such. While, as he said, all other sciences cut out some partial domain of Being for themselves and work on it for its own sake, First Philosophy investigates what universally pertains to Being as such. If we keep in mind that under the heading of "Being", it is Being in the sense of what is real that is being aimed at here, then we already have a definition, albeit provisional, of the concept of metaphysical ontology. Today, we shall understand metaphysics itself differently, and more broadly. In short, its concept should be best defined in the following way.In a certain way, every empirical science is a science of what is real. It deals with real things, with their real becoming, with their real relations, etc. Each such science is, therefore, in its way, an ontology. And, since each empirical science investigates a special sphere of real Being, the totality of all empirical science, actual or still to be constituted, seems to give access to the sum total of reality and to satisfy all epistemological interests regarding reality in a way commensurate to the state of development of these sciences. Upon closer examination, however, this is not the case.