Remarks on Currie
pp. 113-140
in: Richard Freadman, Lloyd Reinhardt (eds), On literary theory and philosophy, Berlin, Springer, 1991Abstract
Part of what I shall attempt to do in my comments on Gregory Currie's paper, "Interpreting Fictions', is to take it as an opportunity for diagnosis. My tactic will be to mark my own presuppositions as I delineate points of difference, rather than to attempt to describe his, leaving my reader to organise these into contrasting sets as she/he sees fit. I shall, however, name the space of the two sets. On the assumption that the differences between us correspond at least to disciplinary boundaries, I shall adopt the convention of calling the field of Currie's work "philosophy of literature', and the field of mine "literary theory', firstly, because the assumption of a commonality of topic is almost certainly misleading, and secondly, because I think that disciplinary habits correspond to the technical presuppositions of a professional practice, and that these have a substantive role in the debates we can, and cannot, have.
