Logical, ontological and methodological aspects of scientific revolutions

M. Strauss

pp. 31-49

in: Robert E. Butts, Jaakko Hintikka (eds), Historical and philosophical dimensions of logic, methodology and philosophy of science, Berlin, Springer, 1977

Abstract

Scientific revolutions — from Copernicus to Einstein and Bohr — have been the subject of many studies, but I don"t think the topic has been exhausted or even treated in the manner it deserves. Usually, the revolutionary elements are overrated and the conservative ones overlooked or underrated. The most notorious example of such an approach is Kuhn's (1962) conception of scientific evolution as a sequence of `paradigms". In contrast to such views I shall endeavour to show that the scientific revolutions of the past are highly conservative, indeed in more than one respect, and that this is one reason for their success. Thus, the modern historiological anarchists will find no support in the following pages. On the other hand, the conservatives will draw no comfort either. Not only are further revolutions in fundamental theory unavoidable, but in examining both the dialectics of continuity and discontinuity in previous revolutions and the present needs for theory change we shall find reasons to expect that future revolutions in fundamental theory will show quite novel features hardly fitting into the present schemes of theory change.