
Publication details
Publisher: Springer
Place: Berlin
Year: 2010
Pages: 139-168
Series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science
ISBN (Hardback): 9789048138500
Full citation:
, "Fictional entities, theoretical models and figurative truth", in: Beyond mimesis and convention, Berlin, Springer, 2010


Fictional entities, theoretical models and figurative truth
pp. 139-168
in: Roman Frigg, Matthew C. Hunter (eds), Beyond mimesis and convention, Berlin, Springer, 2010Abstract
In setting up his influential "constructive empiricist" project, Bas van Fraassen (1980, 12) characterizes realism about scientific theories by the following three claims: (i) Scientific theories should be interpreted "at face value". If the theory includes the sentence "there are quarks", it should be understood as making the same kind of claim we make when we say "there are cans of beer in the refrigerator": there is no reinterpretation. (ii) Scientific theories purport to be true (iii). We may in principle have good reasons for believing that a scientific theory is true.
Publication details
Publisher: Springer
Place: Berlin
Year: 2010
Pages: 139-168
Series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science
ISBN (Hardback): 9789048138500
Full citation:
, "Fictional entities, theoretical models and figurative truth", in: Beyond mimesis and convention, Berlin, Springer, 2010