In defense of mental representation

Barbara Von Eckardt

pp. 471-493

in: Peter Grdenfors, Peter Gärdenfors, Jan Woleński, Katarzyna Kijania-Placek (eds), In the scope of logic, methodology and philosophy of science II, Berlin, Springer, 2002

Abstract

One of the principal tenets of contemporary cognitive psychology is that there are mental representations. In this paper I consider two critiques of that assumption by philosophers who are otherwise disposed to be friendly towards cognitive psychology. In other words, these are not radical critiques; each critic believes that, if understood in the right way, cognitive psychology is a worthy scientific endeavor. However, each also believes that it is an endeavor that could be and ought to be conducted without the notion of mental representation. The two critiques I will consider are by Stephen Stich and Stephen Horst. Although, as we will see, the arguments given in each case are quite different, they, ultimately turn on the same basic point: that the positing of mental representations, contrary to what most cognitive psychologists believe, does no real explanatory work. Stich believes this is the case because he thinks there is no explanatory work for which mental representations are needed. Horst seems willing to grant the existence of an appropriate explanandum but argues that, as currently conceived, mental representations cannot do the job.

Cited authors

Stich Stephen