Moral education, justice, and punishment

pp. 113-138

in: John Shook, Dewey's social philosophy, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014

Abstract

The Current State of Legal Theory concerning punishment is thoroughly fragmented and in dire need of reconstruction upon fundamental principles. Although retribution no longer stands as a dominant monolithic theory, its continued influence shapes contemporary discussion over the justification of punishment. Against those who are committed to retaining some tenets of retributivism, Dewey's social philosophy would eliminate any appeal to retribution. While Dewey's extensive writings in moral and social philosophy do not contain a systematic treatment of punishment, his understanding of our moral practices can be used to construct a valuable alternative to retributivism. Because a liberal democracy should aim at enhancing the social responsibility of all citizens, the punishment of offenders cannot simply be a matter of retribution.