Kuhn's social epistemology and the sociology of science

K. B. Wray

pp. 167-183

in: William J. Devlin, Alisa Bokulich (eds), Kuhn's structure of scientific revolutions, Berlin, Springer, 2015

Abstract

I aim to clarify (i) the relationship between Kuhn's social epistemology of science and the sociology of science, and (ii) the nature of Kuhn's positive legacy to the philosophy of science. I begin by recounting Kuhn's relationship to the sociology of science. First, I examine the influence of sociology of science on Structure. Surprisingly, sociology of science had very little influence on Kuhn as he wrote Structure. Second, I examine early responses to Kuhn's work by sociologists of science. Both the Mertonians and their successors, the proponents of the Strong Programme, were profoundly influenced by Structure. Third, I examine Kuhn's views on the relevance of sociology to his own work. Kuhn, I argue, believed the sociology of science was indispensible to his project. Finally, I examine his constructive contributions to the epistemology of science. Kuhn, I argue, has provided us with the foundations for building a social epistemology of science. In Structure, Kuhn noted that the structure of a research community changes as it responds to different types of research problems. And in his later work, Kuhn came to see that the creation of new scientific specialties plays an integral role in the advancement of science.