Architecture-based conceptions of mind

Aaron Sloman

pp. 403-427

in: Peter Grdenfors, Peter Gärdenfors, Jan Woleński, Katarzyna Kijania-Placek (eds), In the scope of logic, methodology and philosophy of science II, Berlin, Springer, 2002

Abstract

It is argued that our ordinary concepts of mind are both implicitly based on architectural presuppositions and also cluster concepts. By showing that different information processing architectures support different classes of possible concepts, and that cluster concepts have inherent indeterminacy that can be reduced in different ways for different purposes we point the way to a research programme that promises important conceptual clarification in disciplines concerned with what minds are, how they evolved, how they can go wrong, and how new types can be made, e.g. philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, biology and artificial intelligence.